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I. Introduction
This Note examines the constitutionality of a municipal
regulation that restricts free expression and results in unequal
access to a public forum. In Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority,1 the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit upheld a New York City regulation that restricted the noise
level of musical performances conducted in subway stations and
banned entirely the use of any amplification device on subway
platforms.2 Musicians who were effectively excluded from play-
ing on subway platforms because of the amplifier ban challenged
the restriction as an unconstitutional infringement on their fun-
damental right of free expression.'
In overturning the district court decision that held the am-
plifier ban violated the musicians' first amendment rights, the
court of appeals concluded that the regulation was a reasonable
time, place or manner restriction. The court applied the stan-
dard of review articulated by the Supreme Court in Ward v.
Rock Against Racism' and found that the regulation was valid
because it was content-neutral, narrowly tailored to serve a sig-
nificant governmental interest, and one which left open ample
alternative channels for the communication. 5
In determining the appropriate standard for review, the
court of appeals failed to adequately consider two factors. First,
precedent dictates that a court examine the type of public forum
affected by the restriction and the impact the restriction has on
1. 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. N.Y. ComP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(c)(4) (1989).
3. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 916. Subway Troubadours Against Repression, an organ-
ization whose purpose is to promote the rights of subway musicians, joined in the action.
Id. at 915.
4. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
5. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 916.
1
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free expression in that forum. Second, a court must consider the
burden the exclusion of some speakers from a public forum im-
poses on free expression and equal protection guarantees. The
Carew-Reid court did neither. Instead, the court of appeals ap-
plied a lenient standard for review and upheld the regulation.
Part II of the Note examines the development of judicial
standards for reviewing restrictions on free expression including:
the distinction between "high" and "low" value speech; the con-
tent-neutral/content-based distinction; the evolution of free-ex-
pression rights in public forums; and the extent to which govern-
mental regulations in the public forum may legitimately burden
free expression. These doctrines combine to establish the appro-
priate review of regulations on speech in the public forum. Part
III traces the facts and procedural history of Carew-Reid and
discusses the court of appeals' opinion. An analysis of the court's
opinion follows in Part IV. The court of appeals limited its re-
view of the case by adopting the Ward standard and applied
neither the traditional public forum analysis nor considered
fourteenth amendment equal protection guarantees. This Note
concludes in Part V that the court of appeals' reliance on Ward
was misplaced and that the standard of review adopted by the
court of appeals was inappropriate in light of judicial precedent.
II. Background
A. Free Expression: The Extent of First Amendment
Protection
The right of free expression guaranteed by the first amend-
ment of the United States Constitution' is not an absolute
right.7 Ever since Justices Holmes and Brandeis dissented in
6. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1961) (first amendment
protection applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment).
7. Justice Harlan expressed this view when he wrote:
At the outset we reject the view that freedom of speech and association, as pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, are "absolutes," not only in the
undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists it must prevail,
but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be gathered solely
from a literal reading of the First Amendment.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49 (1961) (citation omitted). Justice
Black's dissent was joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas. The dissent
argued for an absolute right to free expression: "I believe that the First Amendment's
[Vol. 11:643
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Abrams v. United States,' the Supreme Court has grappled with
the constitutionality of limitations on free expression.' In subse-
quent opinions, the Court has examined the extent to which gov-
ernment may regulate free expression based on the content10 or
on the location of the speech." The Court's analyses of govern-
mental restrictions on free expression have focused on two ele-
ments: the extent to which a restriction furthers the govern-
ment's interest and the burden that the restriction imposes on
free expression."5 In essence, the development and application of
judicial review of restrictions on free expression has been per-
ceived by many to be a balancing of the government's interest in
unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgement of the rights of free speech
and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing'
that was to be done in this field." Id. at 61.
8. 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (the Court upheld appellant's
convictions under the Espionage Acts which prohibited speech encouraging resistance to
the war effort). In dissent, Justice Holmes wrote:
I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expres-
sion of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, unless they
so imminently threaten immediate interference with the lawful and pressing pur-
poses of the law that an immediate check is required to save the country.
Id. at 630.
9. The difficulties the Court has faced are reflected in its diverse approaches and
opinions. According to one commentator:
There are numerous major decisions in which the Court has subordinated free
speech values to other social interests; they involve nearly every form of suppres-
sion and have issued from both liberal and conservative Courts. Even in the cases
that ultimately protect free speech, the Court often achieves the protection by
indirection - by statutory construction or by the use of doctrines like over-
breadth, vagueness, and procedural due process - and these techniques manifest
distrust of the other branches and levels of government more clearly than outright
approval of the free speech values involved. In the relatively few decisions resting
directly on free speech considerations, the Court often hedges its rulings with
enough cautions and limitations to put into question the scope of the Court's com-
mitment to free speech.
Nagel, How Useful Is Judicial Review In Free Speech Cases?, 69 CORNFLL L. Rav. 302
(1984).
10. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that obscene material is not
protected by the first amendment).
11. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding a ban on political activity when
conducted on a military base).
12. Justice Frankfurter posed the following four questions as essential to determin-
ing the validity of governmental restrictions on free expression: "1) What is the interest
deemed to require the regulation of speech? ... 2) What is the method used to achieve
such ends as a consequence of which public speech is constrained or barred? ... 3) What
mode of speech is regulated? ... 4) Where does the speaking which is regulated take
place?" Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
3
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the regulation against an individual's fundamental right to free
expression.13
B. "High" and "Low" Value Speech
In its analysis of regulations on free expression, the Su-
preme Court has historically made a distinction between "high"
value and "low" value speech. 14 High value speech conveys
ideas, beliefs, emotions, or opinions." Restrictions on high value
13. This balancing test has long been a staple of free expression cases:
This court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as funda-
mental personal rights and liberties....
Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public conve-
nience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be
insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the main-
tenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult
task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substan-
tiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment
of the rights.
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (Roberts, J.); see also Ely, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analy-
sis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amend-
ment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983); T. EMERSON, THE FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
(1970).
14. Some political theorists would extend the protection of free speech only to
speech that is "explicitly political." See Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26 (1971). Others would extend the protection to
all speech. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245
(1961). The Supreme Court has adopted an approach between these two extremes, but
accords greatest protection to political speech.
15. The theory of high and low speech stems from dictum in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the Court found:
Allowing the broadest scope to the language and purpose of the fourteenth
amendment, it is well understood that the right of free speech is not absolute at
all times and under all circumstances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly
limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never
been thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or "fighting" words - those
which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach
of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.
Id. at 571-72.
This principle of distinguishing high speech has been followed in later cases. See,
e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/8
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speech receive the strictest scrutiny by the judiciary.'6 Con-
versely, low value speech is viewed as being of limited social
value and thus has been accorded less protection by the courts.17
In reviewing restrictions on low value speech, the Court has
enunciated unique tests for each type of low value speech."8
Thus, the analysis of a restriction on commercial speech's will
not necessarily examine the same elements, nor give equal
weight to elements, as the analysis of restrictions on obscene
speech. 0 Similarly, the analysis of obscene speech will differ
from that of speech which advocates unlawful action."1 High
value speech, when employed by the speaker as a mask for low
value speech, may be constitutionaly restricted under low value
speech analysis. 2
One example of low value speech is commercial expression.
Commercial expression receives special scrutiny because of its
capacity to be misleading or false.2 ' As a result, the judiciary has
771 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
16. Stone, supra note 13 at 196. High value speech has been distinguished for
greater protection. Professor Stone has noted that "in dealing with high value speech,
the Court employs . . . a far more speech-protective analysis. Indeed, in assessing the
constitutionality of content-based restrictions on high value expression, the Court em-
ploys a standard that approaches absolute protection." Id.
17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New
York, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (requiring that the regulatory technique employed to re-
strict commercial speech be in proportion to the substantiality of the government's inter-
est in the regulation and that the limitation on speech be carefully designed to achieve
the government's legitimate goal); Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (requiring that the speech ap-
peal to prurient interests, be patently offensive, and lack serious literary, artistic, politi-
cal, or scientific value when taken as a whole).
19. Central Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 566.
20. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
21. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (requiring that speech that is
directed at inciting or producing imminent unlawful action be likely to produce such
action in order for it to be punished).
22. Political speech that includes direct advocacy of criminal action creates a clear
and present danger and, therefore, may be restricted. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47, 52 (1919); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449 (Black, J., concurring).
23. See, e.g., Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) (upholding a prohibition
on the distribution of commercial advertising matter on any street), overruled by
Schaumberg v. Citizens for Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). Schaumberg rejected the
holding in Valentine that commercial expression receives no constitutional protection.
Id. at 632-33. The Schaumberg Court recognized limited protection for commercial ex-
pression. Id. at 636-37.
24. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (state's interest
5
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lessened the standard for review of restrictions on commercial
expression and has consequently been more deferential to gov-
ernmental regulation in this area.26 Nonetheless, the government
must still demonstrate a sufficient interest for the regulation to
be valid. 6 Other low value speech includes: obscene speech,27
speech that advocates and incites unlawful action, 8 fighting
words, 2  and libel.30
Determining the standard of review and level of scrutiny
applicable in a specific case becomes further complicated when
the speech is nonverbal symbolic expression.-" Before establish-
ing the appropriate standard for review of restrictions on sym-
bolic expression, courts must determine that the conduct is suffi-
ciently communicative to constitute expression.3 2 The Court has
in protecting the public from possible fraud is a sufficiently substantial interest to justify
a narrowly tailored regulation of commercial expression).
25. Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion up-
holding city policy permitting the display of commercial advertisements but prohibiting
controversial, political, or public issue advertising in the interior of city buses).
26. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447
U.S. 557 (1980) (invalidating a ban on all public utility advertising that promoted the
use of electricity because the government's interest in the ban was insufficient to justify
the restriction on free expression).
27. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
28. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (upholding protection for speech
which advocates violence as long as the speech does not incite people to imminent
action).
29. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (holding that libelous
speech is knowingly and recklessly false is not protected by the Constitution).
31. See Henkin, Foreword: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARv. L. REV. 63 (1968). Henkin
illustrates this complexity as follows:
A constitutional distinction between speech and conduct is specious. Speech is
conduct, and actions speak. There is nothing intrinsically sacred about wagging
the tongue or wielding a pen; there is nothing intrinsically more sacred about
words than other symbols.... The meaningful constitutional distinction is not
between speech and conduct, but between conduct that speaks, communicates,
and other kinds of conduct.
Id. at 79-80 (emphasis in original).
32. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (holding that enforce-
ment of public indecency ordinance requiring that otherwise nude dancers at adult en-
tertainment establishments wear G-strings and pasties did not violate the first amend-
ment); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (overturning appellant's conviction
under a state flag misuse statute for affixing an adhesive peace symbol to the United
States flag and displaying it from a window). See Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic
Speech Under the First Amendment, 21 U.C.LA. L. REv. 29 (1973). Nimmer observed:
Whatever else may or may not be true of speech, as an irreducible minimum it
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/8
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recognized that symbolic expression including actions,33 en-
tertainment,34 and music,s  may be classified as high or low
value based on the content and communicative impact of the
expression." Unlike words, there is no denotation for symbolic
expression; thus, the Court, in extending protection to this type
of expression, must determine the expression's message before it
applies the appropriate level of review.
3 7
C. The Content-Based/Content-Neutral Distinction
To further assist courts in determining the appropriate
standard for reviewing restrictions on free expression, the Su-
preme Court has adopted an approach distinguishing laws that
regulate the content of speech from laws that are not content-
based.38 The latter are referred to as restrictions on the time,
must constitute a communication.... [U]nless there is a human communicator
intending to convey a meaning by his conduct, it would be odd to think of it as
conduct constituting a communication protected by the first amendment.
Id. at 36.
33. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(holding unconstitutional a prohibition on armbands in the public school because the
armbands represented students' opposition to the United States government's policy in
Vietnam).
34. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981) (holding unconstitu-
tional a prohibition on all live entertainment in the borough).
35. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989) (recognizing that
music is a constitutionally protected form of expression, but upholding a city ordinance
requiring that all performers use city owned and operated amplification equipment when
performing at a public park's bandshell because although the restriction applied in a
traditional public forum, it did not limit access to that forum). See generally, Note,
Ward v. Rock Against Racism: Reasonable Regulations and State Sponsored Sound, 10
PACE L. REV. 633 (1990).
36. See Nimmer, supra note 32.
37. Chief Justice Warren recognized the limits of extending constitutional protec-
tion to conduct:
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be
labeled "speech" whenever the person engaging in conduct intends thereby to ex-
press an idea.... This Court has held that when "speech" and "nonspeech" ele-
ments are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms.
United States v. O'Brien, 291 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
38. This approach is central to the Court's analysis. "[R]estrictions that turn on the
content of expression are subjected to a strict form of judicial review, while those con-
cerned with matters other than content receive more limited examination. With only
minor aberrations, the Supreme Court has adhered to this distinction in a series of re-
7
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place or manner of expression."9 Determining whether a restric-
tion is content-based or content-neutral, just as determining
whether speech is of high or low value, is a pivotal factor in judi-
cial analysis. 0 Similar to restrictions placed on high value
speech," restrictions that are content-based have received strin-
gent review. 4 The more stringent review of content-based re-
strictions occurs because such restrictions often result in prior
restraints on speech, 3 or may create unequal access to a forum
based on the message the speaker is attempting to convey." The
higher level of review on content-based restrictions reflects the
belief that the first amendment's purpose is to ensure unfettered
high value expression.'5 Conversely, the Court gives deference to
those regulations that restrict low value speech." Thus, within
the Court's balancing of governmental interests and individual
rights, the general presumption is that in order to be valid, a
regulation that restricts protected, high value speech must be
content-neutral and incidental to the unfettered exercise of free
expression.'7
cent decisions." Redish, supra note 13, at 113 (footnotes omitted).
39. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941).
40. See generally Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68
VA. L. Rav. 203 (1982).
41. Id. at 207.
42. Stephan described this principle:
[T]he constitutional principle limiting the power of government to distinguish
speech according to its content has played a significant role in the Supreme
Court's decisions. Although the Court soon backed away from the broad statement
that the Constitution absolutely forbids such discrimination, it has continued to
speak of the Constitution's "hostility" to all regulation of the content of speech,
including government "prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic."
Stephan, supra note 41, at 204 (footnotes 'omitted).
43. Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976) ("[P]rior restraints on
speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First
Amendment rights.").
44. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("There is an 'equality
of status in the field of ideas' and government must afford all points of view an equal
opportunity to be heard.").
45. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 17-29 and accompanying text.
47. In Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), the Court stated:
[Gleneral regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but
incidentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of
law the first or fourteenth amendment forbade Congress or the States to pass,
when they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental inter-
ests, a prerequisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing
[Vol. 11:643
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The principle of subjecting content-based regulations to
more stringent review is more difficult to apply when symbolic
expression is restricted.48 In reviewing such regulations, the
Court has employed the balancing test that allows incidental
limitations on first amendment freedom of expression provided
the government can demonstrate a sufficiently important inter-
est in the regulation."9
D. Content-Neutral Regulations: Restrictions on the Time,
Place or Manner of Expression
Content-neutral regulations50 - those restricting the time,
place or manner of expression - have generally received less
scrutiny by the Supreme Court.8 ' The Court has recognized that
the exercise of even high value speech may result in a nuisance
that the government has the authority to restrict. 52 For example,
the government could probably prohibit a political protest in the
middle of Times Square at rush hour."8 All regulations on pro-
tected free expression, including those that are content-neutral,
must withstand judicial review for facial validity, " impact, 5 and
application.5" The standard the Court has established for re-
of the governmental interest involved.
Id. at 50-51.
48. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
49. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding convictions of defend-
ants who burned their draft cards as part of an antiwar demonstration because the gov-
ernment has a substantial interest in preventing the destruction of issued Selective Ser-
vice certificates).
50. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
51. See infra notes 67-75 and accompanying text. However, the level of scrutiny
applied by the judiciary will depend on the nature of the forum and the impact which
the restriction has on protected free expression.
52. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding a statute prohibiting vehicles
containing a sound amplifier and similar devices from emitting loud and raucous noises).
53. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (overturning the conviction of appel-
lant under a statute prohibiting the obstruction of the administration of justice after
appellant led a demonstration outside a local courthouse).
54. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (holding as facially invalid a ban on
the distribution of pamphlets without first obtaining a permit because the ban allows for
prior restraint and has a chilling effect on speech).
55. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (ordinance prohibiting leafletting on any
street held invalid because the governmental interest in preventing littering is insuffi-
cient to justify the burden on free expression).
56. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951) (ordinance vesting the control of restric-
9
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viewing content-neutral regulations requires a determination
that the regulation be reasonable, narrowly tailored to further a
significant governmental interest, and that it allows ample alter-
native channels for the expression."7
E. The Public Forum Doctrine
Accomplishing a governmental interest via a time, place or
manner regulation on free expression is further limited by the
place where the expression occurs." The level of scrutiny ap-
plied to content-neutral regulations varies in relation to the na-
ture of the forum." The Court distinguishes public from pri-
vately owned property because the first amendment generally
limits government action, not actions by private parties.60 In at-
tempting to define the characteristics of public property, the
Court has distinguished three types of public forums:6 l the
traditional public forum, 2 public property the state has opened
for expressive activity,63 and public property that is not by tra-
tions on religious meetings in an administrative official without proper standards for per-
mit review is invalid).
57. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v.
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)).
58. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (upholding a prohibition on
noise that disrupts classwork at schools although the noise emanates from a public
sidewalk).
59. Id. at 116 ("The crucial question is whether the manner of expression is basi-
cally incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular time.").
See infra notes 60-69.
60. The question whether to extend constitutional protection to privately owned fo-
rums has received some attention by the Court. Most notably, the Court has extended
protection to privately owned property when it functions as an open public forum. See,
e.g., Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976) (extending protection to a privately owned
shopping center); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (requiring ac-
cess to broadcasting media).
61. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
62. The traditional public forum includes streets and parks. These places were dis-
tinguished as unique in the opinion of the Court in Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496 (1939). Justice Roberts wrote:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing
public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient
times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Id. at 515.
63. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (a state university that makes its
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/8
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dition or designation open for free expression. 4 The traditional
public forum and the public forum opened for expressive activ-
ity are subjected to the same strict standard of review,68 while
regulations that restrict speech in the nontraditional, non-
opened public forum will be given greater deference.66
An integral part of the review of time, place or manner reg-
ulations in the public forum is the examination of the restriction
of access to the forum.67 Though the government may open or
close nontraditional forums at its discretion," it may not pro-
vide speakers with unequal access to an opened public forum.6 9
The application of the standard for reviewing content-neu-
tral regulations on free speech in the public forum is most un-
certain when symbolic expression is regulated. Symbolic
facilities generally available for activities by student groups may not bar use by such a
group for religious worship or discussion).
64. United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985) (upholding the exclusion of an
individual from a military base where the individual had previously been permanently
barred from the base for unlawful conduct, even though the individual's present purpose
in entering the base was to engage in peaceful expressive activity during the base's an-
nual open house).
65. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
66. Id.
67. In reviewing time, place, or manner restrictions, the Court may find that the
regulation at issue provides unequal access to speakers raising the possibility that the
regulation violates both the first amendment and the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Like a finding of prior restraint, overbreadth, or vagueness, a finding
of unequal access to a public forum is sufficient to hold a regulation invalid. See Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (emphasizing the relationship between
the first amendment and equal protection in the analysis of discriminatory regulations
on free expression).
68. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (government not required to retain indefinitely the open
character of the forum); see also City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,
466 U.S. 789 (1984) (ordinance prohibiting the posting of any signs on public property
held valid); Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
69. In Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981), the Court invali-
dated a city ordinance prohibiting outdoor advertisements except for twelve specified
categories, including political campaign signs and for-sale signs. The Court held that the
city could not distinguish between various communicative interests; it must allow bill-
boards conveying other messages. Id. at 512.
70. See Note, The Public Forum: Minimum Access, Equal Access, and the First
Amendment, 28 STAN. L. Rsv. 117 (1975). As the commentator noted:
If first amendment values are to be preserved in the public arena, the Court must
devise a more reliable method of extending to expression-related conduct in the
public forum the protection that flows from strict first amendment review. A logi-
cal first step toward formulating such a method is the Court's framing of first
amendment coverage questions in the symbolic speech context.
11
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speech analysis incorporates the test for all time, place or man-
ner regulations enunciated by the Court in United States v.
Grace.71 In Grace, the Court affirmed the proposition that "the
government may enforce reasonable time, place, and manner
regulations as long as the restrictions 'are content-neutral, are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest, and
leave open ample alternative channels of communication.' '172
The Court in Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence73 further clarified the application of constitutional protec-
tion of symbolic expression by recognizing that:
It is also true that a message may be delivered by conduct
that is intended to be communicative and that, in context, would
reasonably be understood by the viewer to be communicative.
Symbolic expression of this kind may be forbidden or regulated if
the conduct itself may constitutionally be regulated, if the regula-
tion is narrowly drawn to further a substantial governmental in-
terest, and if the interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
speech.74
In reviewing regulations that limit symbolic expression in a pub-
lic forum, a court must consider both the message conveyed by
the action and the validity of the government's interest in sup-
pressing the conduct. 5
III. Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority
A. The Facts
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) is a
public benefit corporation established by New York State to de-
velop and improve mass transportation in New York City and
the surrounding areas.7 6 The MTA oversees the Transportation
Authority (TA) whose purpose is to develop rules of conduct in
transit facilities for the safety of the public and smooth opera-
Id. at 132-33 (footnotes omitted).
71. 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
72. Id. at 177 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 45).
73. 468 U.S. 288 (1984).
74. Id. at 294 (citations omitted). See also supra notes 1-37 and accompanying text.
75. Id.
76. Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914, 915 (2d Cir. 1990) (cit-
ing N.Y. PuB. AuTH. LAW §§ 1262, 1263(1), 1264 (McKinney 1982 & Supp. 1990)).
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tion of the system."
In 1985, the MTA sponsored "Music Under New York"
(MUNY), a program that allowed musicians to perform in select
subway stations." In 1987, the TA issued Experimental Rule
section 1050.6 permitting musicians to perform on subway plat-
forms.79 This rule prohibited the playing of any instrument that
created "excessive noise."80 Amplifiers were allowed only if a
permit was first obtained from the TA's police department."
These permits provided that musicians using amplifiers could
not play above ninety decibels.8 2
In 1989, the TA amended and codified the experimental
rule.8 s The revised rule prohibited the use of amplifiers on sub-
way platforms and restricted all musical performances to a noise
level not to exceed eighty-five decibels when measured from five
77. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 915.
78. Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.
5, 1990).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. A decibel is a logarithmic unit normally used for expressing differences in
signal strength. J. MARTIN, TELRCOMMUNICATIONS AND THE COMPUTER 135-40 (2d ed.
1976). A decibel does not measure the absolute strength of a signal, but rather it is used
to compare the power of two signals. Id. at 135. Consequently, it is understandable that
the decibel was first used as a unit referring to sound, because the response of the human
ear is proportional to the logarithm of the sound energy itself. Id. In other words, if one
noise sounds twice as great as another, it is not in fact twice the power, but it is approxi-
mately two decibels greater. Id.
Decibels are used to express various quantities such as gain in amplifiers, noise
levels, losses in transmission lines, and also differences in sound intensity. Id. at 137. For
example, the intensity of common sounds measured in decibels relative to the threshold
of hearing are expressed as follows:
pain threshold, 120; jet engine, 110; rock music, 100; noisy traffic, 85; normal street traf-
fic, 75; shouted conversation, 70; normal conversation, 50; quiet conversation, 30; whis-
pered conversation, 10; threshold of hearing, 0. Id. at 139.
83. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 21, § 1050.6(c)(4) (1989), provides:
No activity may be permitted which creates excessive noise or which emits
noise that interferes with transit operations. The emission of any sound in excess
of 85 dBA on the A weighted scale measured at five feet or 70 dBA measured at
two feet from a token booth is excessive noise and is prohibited. In no event will
the use of amplification devices of any kind, electronic or otherwise, be permitted
on subway platforms.
Id. at 3.
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feet away." This rule went into effect October 25, 1989.85
The plaintiffs were musicians who performed in the New
York City subway system. 6 The plaintiffs objected not to the
volume level restriction but to the ban on the use of amplifica-
tion devices." One plaintiff stated that an amplifier was an inte-
gral part of his musical expression and without it, his classical
guitar was only audible from a few feet away. 8 Another plaintiff,
an electric guitar player, contended that his instrument was not
audible without an amplifier.8 9 Neither of these performers
played in the subway after the regulations went into effect.' °
The plaintiffs provided information showing that they could
stay within the decibel limitation when using amplifiers.", The
plaintiffs argued that because there was no necessary connection
between amplified music and loud music, the amplifier ban sup-
pressed more speech than necessary to achieve noise reduction.2
The plaintiffs sought to enjoin enforcement of the rule on the
ground that the amplifier ban violated their constitutional right
to free speech.93 The defendants claimed that the ban on ampli-
fication devices was necessary to serve the TA's interest in pub-
lic safety.'
B. The Lower Court Decision
The district court, in an opinion issued by Judge Stanton,
held for the plaintiffs.9 " The court's opinion recognized that mu-
sical expression is protected speech under the first amendment. 6
The court noted that the standard of review is determined by
84. Id.
85. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 916.
86. Id. at 915.
87. Id. at 916.
88. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 4-5.
89. Id. at 5.
90. Id. at 5-6.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 10.
94. Id.
95. Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 89 Civ. 7738 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
1990).
96. Id. at 11 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989)).
[Vol. 11:643
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol11/iss3/8
CAREW-REID
the type of forum in which the speech occurs.97 The court began
its review by defining the principles of the public forum doctrine
and identifying the type of forum affected by the regulation."
The court cited Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Association" as the guideline for reviewing laws that
regulate speech on public property. 00 Three types of public
property were identified in Perry: the traditional public forum,
the opened public forum, and the non-public forum.101 The dis-
trict court in Carew-Reid held the subway to be a designated
public forum because the TA intentionally opened the subway
platform to musical performances. 0 2 Thus, the court held that
the regulation was valid only if it were "narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and [would] leave[] open
ample alternative channels for musical expression.' 03
The court examined the regulation by first defining the nar-
rowly tailored requirement,' 0 ' recognizing that a complete ban
can be narrowly tailored, "but only if each activity within the
proscription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil."'' 0 It also
recognized that a rule "is narrowly tailored if it targets and elim-
inates no more than the exact source of the 'evil' it seeks to rem-
edy."' 0' Here the amplifier ban applied to musicians who might
otherwise meet the noise level standard.10 7 Because these musi-
cians were excluded from performing, the rule was not narrowly
tailored.'08
Additionally, the court noted that the Supreme Court in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism'09 held that if a government's
97. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 11-12.
98. Id. at 12-13.
99. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
100. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 12.
101. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
102. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 13-14.
103. Id. at 14.
104. Id. at 14-15.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id. (quoting Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988)).
107. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 14.
108. Id. at 16.
109. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989) (upholding governmental control over amplification
equipment used for public presentations in a city owned bandshell). In Ward, the Court
reviewed a regulation that limited all performers at New York City's Bandshell in Cen-
tral Park to the use of city-supplied amplification equipment. This equipment was to be
1991]
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"regulatory scheme had a substantial deleterious effect on the
ability of . . . performers to achieve the quality of sound they
desired, respondent's concerns would have considerable
force." 110 The district court found this analysis applicable to Ca-
rew-Reid.'11 The ban on the use of amplifiers in Carew-Reid not
only excluded some musicians from the forum but also "severely
hampered" the artistic expression of those who continued to
play without amplifiers.1 2 The court then examined other
means of effectuating the MTA's concern in preventing excessive
noise. 13 It suggested that enforcement of the decibel level rule,
though arguably less convenient, would be equally effective in
accomplishing the goal.114 The court cited Riley v. National
Federation of the Blind of North Carolina 5 as support for the
principle that "convenience of regulation cannot justify infringe-
ment on protected speech."11
Because it found that the regulation was not narrowly tai-
lored, the court did not reach the question of whether alterna-
tive channels were available." The court enjoined defendants
from enforcing the regulation to the extent that it banned the
use of amplifiers on subway platforms.1
controlled by an independent sound technician hired by the city. The Court found this
regulation to be a reasonable time, place or manner regulation because, although applied
in a traditional public forum, it did not limit access to that forum. The Ward Court
defined the application of the narrow tailoring requirement in light of the equal applica-
tion of the regulation:
The guideline does not ban all concerts, or even all rock concerts, but instead
focuses on the source of the evils the city seeks to eliminate - excessive and
inadequate sound amplification - and eliminates them without at the same time
banning or significantly restricting a substantial quantity of speech that does not
create the same evils. This is the essence of narrow tailoring.
Id. at 2758 n. 7.
110. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 16 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109
S. Ct. 2746, 2759 (1989)).
111. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 16.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 16-17.
115. 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (holding that the first amendment does not permit the
government to sacrifice speech for efficiency).
116. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 17 n.9 (citing Riley, 487 U.S. 781 (1988)).
117. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738.
118. Id. at 17, 21.
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C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The defendants appealed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit,119 which reversed the district court
in a unanimous decision, authored by Circuit Judge Meskill, de-
livered on May 18, 1990.120
The court of appeals dispensed with any review of whether
the subway constitutes a public forum.121 Instead, the court held
that the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the
time, place or manner of protected speech, provided the restric-
tions "are justified without reference to the content of the regu-
lated speech, that they are narrowly tailored to serve a signifi-
cant governmental interest, and that they leave open ample
alternative channels for communication of the information.
1 22
In applying this standard of review the court examined and
defined the elements beginning with content neutrality.1 23 The
court held that in a content-neutral regulation "the 'evil' that
the regulation seeks to eliminate cannot be the regulated expres-
sion's content or message." '24 Even though the regulation may
produce an "incidental effect on some speakers or messages, 1 I 25
the court found the regulation may still be content-neutral. The
court recognized that "the regulation is based on a particular
medium of expression and in fact is a complete ban on the use of
that medium.' 2 6 The court found the regulation to be content-
neutral because "[t]he object of the amplifier ban, nevertheless,
is the elimination of excessive noise on subway platforms, not
the suppression of the kind of 'electrified' music that appellees
play."' 2 7
Having found the regulation content-neutral, the court pro-
ceeded with a review of the narrowly tailored requirement, not-
ing that the elimination of noise is an important goal and that
119. Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1990).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 919.
122. Id. (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2753 (1989)).
123. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 916.
124. Id.
125. Id. (quoting Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2754).
126. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 917.
127. Id.
1991]
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here, the interest is bolstered by public safety concerns. 2 8 As a
result, narrow tailoring is accomplished "so long as the... regu-
lation promotes a substantial government interest that would be
achieved less effectively absent the regulation."
1 29
Though the district court accepted the plaintiffs' argument
that the ban suppresses more speech than is necessary to
achieve the interest of noise reduction, the court of appeals dis-
agreed, finding error on two counts. 30 "First, the district court
improperly relied on the perceived availability of the less-re-
strictive alternative to the amplifier ban - the use of decibel
meters. . . . Second, the district court imposed an excessively
exacting standard in concluding that the amplifier ban is
broader than necessary to achieve the goal of noise
reduction."""
Additionally, the court of appeals faulted the lower court
for misapplication of a statement made in Ward v. Rock Against
Racism."' The Ward Court suggested that "[i]f the city's regu-
latory scheme had a substantial deleterious effect on the ability
of... performers to achieve the quality of sound they desired,"
the regulation might sweep too broadly.' The court of appeals
distinguished Ward because "in the instant case the source of
the 'evil' is the medium of expression itself;" as a result, "the
regulation would be less effective absent this restriction.' 3I The
court concluded that the amplifier ban met the narrow tailoring
requirement. 3 5
The court proceeded with a brief review of available alter-
native channels, finding other channels available because the
musicians "can perform in some of the subway mezzanines and
above ground and still reach similar, if not the same,
audiences."'3 6
The court held that the amplifier ban was a reasonable
128. Id.
129. Id. (quoting Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2758).
130. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 917.
131. Id. at 917-18.
132. Id. at 918.
133. Id. (quoting Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2758).
134. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 919.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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time, place or manner regulation. 7 In light of this determina-
tion, the court stated that it "need not address the question
whether the subway platforms constitute traditional, designated
or limited public forums."38
IV. Analysis
The court of appeals in Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority" 9 based its decision on the recent Supreme
Court case Ward v. Rock Against Racism." 0 That decision,
though pertinent in establishing the limits and protection of free
expression, should not have been controlling in Carew-Reid. The
collective precedents set by the Court require that restrictions
on free expression be reviewed in light of the full circumstances
and setting of the affected place and parties.' 4 ' A court should
examine the type of forum involved, the effect of the restriction
on free expression and the governmental interest furthered by
the regulation. " 2 Had the court of appeals properly weighed
these considerations, it would have found, as the district court
did, that the regulation did not meet the requirements estab-
lished by the Supreme Court to validate restrictions on free
expression.
The regulation on free expression challenged in Carew-Reid
is a time, place or manner restriction"3 because it regulates ex-
pression based on place (subway platforms) and manner (ampli-
fication).' The Supreme Court has recognized the governmen-
tal interest in enforcing reasonable time, place or manner
regulations on protected speech when they are content-neutral
and are applied in a fair and nondiscriminatory way. 48 Time,
place or manner regulations must be "justified without reference
to the content of the regulated speech, ... narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and.., leave open am-
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1990).
140. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
141. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 7-38 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
144. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 916.
145. See supra notes 49-57 and accompanying text.
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pie alternative channels for communication of the
information."I46
The three elements articulated in Ward for review of time,
place or manner regulations form a central, but by no means ex-
clusive, part of the review of restrictions on free expression." '
The standard of review is incomplete unless the court considers
the location where the speech occurs, the severity of the result-
ing restriction on free expression, and the sufficiency of the gov-
ernment's interest in the regulation. 4  Absent an adequate bal-
ancing of these factors, a likely outcome will be judicial
deference to governmental actions at the expense of free
expression.
A. Governmental Interest: The Public Forum Doctrine
Ignored
In its decisions reviewing regulations on free speech, the Su-
preme Court has sought to maintain a balance between govern-
mental interests and free expression." 9 Various cases have re-
viewed asserted governmental interests including police
powers, 50 public safety,'' and aesthetics, 5 and have estab-
lished the scope of valid governmental regulations in pursuit of
those interests that restrict free expression.
The extent of the governmental interest necessary to re-
strict speech varies depending on the type of forum involved.'
Since Schneider v. State,'" the Court has recognized the impor-
tance of location in establishing the appropriate standard of re-
view for time, place or manner regulations on free expression.15 5
146. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 916 (quoting Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753).
147. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 50-75 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); Schneider v.
State, 308 U.S. 147 (1930).
150. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (in times of war, government has
an interest in controlling hindrances to the war effort).
151. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) (government has an interest in the con-
trol of travel on the streets).
152. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (recognizing a governmental interest in
preventing street littering).
153. See supra notes 58-66 and accompanying text.
154. 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
155. See supra notes 58-75 and accompanying text.
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In Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Asso-
ciation,166 the Court established that public property which the
government has opened for expressive activity is "bound by the
same standards [that] apply in a traditional public forum. "167
Equal access by speakers to public forums has received Court
protection. " Only in those cases involving the restriction of low
value speech " has the Court been deferential to regulations al-
lowing unequal access to a public forum.6'6 Unless the judiciary
reviews time, place or manner regulations by examining the loca-
tion of the speech and the effect of the regulation on equal ac-
cess to the forum, the review is incomplete.
B. The Misapplication of the Ward Decision
In its review, the court of appeals misapplied Ward v. Rock
Against Racism.''6 In Ward all speakers were affected equally
by the regulation, while in Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Trans-
portation Authority6 ' the burden of the restriction fell un-
equally on those speakers who used amplification devices. The
court of appeals applied the Ward standard to Carew-Reid with-
out recognizing that the plaintiffs who required an amplification
device to be heard were effectively excluded from the forum. Ex-
clusion from a public forum is a severe burden on the fundamen-
tal right of free expression. 16 When faced with the practical ef-
fect of unequal access to a public forum, the court must
carefully scrutinize the regulation and find that it is supported
by a substantial governmental interest.'" The court of appeals
156. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
157. Id. at 46.
158. See, e.g., Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981); Police
Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307
U.S. 496 (1939).
159. See supra notes 14-47 and accompanying text.
160. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (accepting an
arbitrary and capricious standard of review for city restrictions on city-owned advertis-
ing space).
161. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
162. 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1990).
163. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99 (1972) (quoting
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971)) ("The crucial question ... is whether [the regula-
tion] advances that objective in a manner consistent with the command of the Equal
Protection Clause.").
164. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980) (citing Mosley, 408 U.S.
1991]
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failed to weigh the regulation in light of the equal protection
concerns that arise when the resulting restriction provides une-
qual access to a public forum, as it does here.
In Carew-Reid, the court of appeals recognized that the gov-
ernmental interest in eradicating excessive noise is significant. 16
In addition, the court held that the exclusion of some speakers
from the forum did not amount to unconstitutional content-
based regulation."' Citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Tax-
payers for Vincent, 6 7 the court of appeals further held that
"even though the regulation is based on a particular medium of
expression and in fact is a complete ban on the use of that me-
dium, it remains neutral with regard to the expression's
content."'
Taxpayers for Vincent, however, is not on point. The fun-
damental issue in Taxpayers for Vincent was not whether the
regulation was valid because it was not content-based, but
rather whether the absolute prohibition of a medium - the
posting of signs on public property - was a constitutional re-
striction of speech in a public forum.16 9 Perry Education Associ-
ation v. Perry Local Educators' Association held that a state is
not required to retain the open characteristic of a non-tradi-
tional public forum.17 0  However, once a forum is opened, the
government may only choose to allow equal access or to close the
I 01ll & , LA , 1 Lfum. nTaxpayers for Vincent, the government c l
close the forum.172 In Carew-Reid, the government is attempting
to leave the forum open - to continue to allow music in the
subway - but to limit access to the forum by effectively ex-
cluding some speakers who are otherwise willing and able to re-
at 98-99) ("When government regulation discriminates among speech-related activities in
a public forum, the Equal Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tai-
lored to serve substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinc-
tions it draws must be carefully scrutinized.").
165. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 917.
166. Id. at 919.
167. 466 U.S. 789 (1984); see supra note 68 and accompanying text.
168. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 917.
169. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
170. 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
171. Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 100-01 (1972).
172. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. at 791.
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main within volume limits set for all speakers in the forum.1 73
This is contrary to both the public forum doctrine 17 ' and the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7 '
Had the court of appeals applied the standard of review for
regulations on free expression in light of the public forum and
equal protection doctrines, it would have reached the same con-
clusion as the district court.17 1 Instead, the court incorrectly re-
lied on Taxpayers for Vincent177 to dispense with the issue of
unequal access and ignored any application of the public forum
doctrine.17 8
Even absent a consideration of the public forum or equal
protection arguments, the court of appeals should have found, as
the district court did, that the government's interest was not
sufficient to justify the regulation.17' The court of appeals in Ca-
rew-Reid acknowledged that music is a form of protected
speech.180 As such, music enjoys the full protection of the first
amendment.181 Whenever protected speech is limited by a regu-
lation, the government must provide sufficient justification for
the regulation.182 The court of appeals failed to question why
both a volume limit and an amplification ban were necessary to
accomplish the government's public safety objective.8 ' Such
deference to governmental regulations on free expression for the
convenience of enforcement is not sufficient grounds to justify
restrictions on free expression.'
By approaching the regulation as separate and distinct from
173. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
174. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
175. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 94-95.
176. Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., No. 89 Civ. 7738 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5,
1990).
177. Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 903 F.2d 914, 919 (2d Cir. 1990)
(citing City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984)).
178. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 919 ("Because we conclude that the amplifier ban is a
reasonable time, place or manner regulation, we need not address the question whether
the subway platforms constitute traditional, designated or limited public forums.").
179. Carew-Reid, No. 89 Civ. 7738 at 20.
180. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 916 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct.
2746, 2753 (1989)).
181. Ward, 109 S. Ct. at 2753.
182. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
183. Carew-Reid, 903 F.2d at 918.
184. See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
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the type of forum involved or the inequity that resulted from
allowing unequal access to a public forum or the sufficiency of
the government's interest in the regulation, the court of appeals
adopted a far less exacting standard for a regulation on free ex-
pression than is required by Supreme Court precedent.
The Court has defined the elements for courts to consider
when reviewing regulations that restrict free expression. The
court of appeals focused its inquiry in Carew-Reid on one ele-
ment - the time, place or manner test - excluding other es-
sential components: the public forum doctrine, the equal access
principle, and the limited significance of the governmental inter-
est in the regulation. By limiting the application of well-estab-
lished judicial principles, the court of appeals cursorily reviewed
the district court decision and in overturning that decision,
eroded judicial protection of the fundamental right to free
expression.
V. Conclusion
Had the court of appeals applied the rules adopted by the
Supreme Court, it would have concluded that the amplification
ban cannot be supported. The district court examined Ward v.
Rock Against Racism,185 but unlike the court of appeals, it rec-
ognized the limited application of that case to the facts here.
The elements for reviewing regulations that restrict free expres-
sion are embodied in the public forum and equal protection doc-
trines. The proper application of these doctrines as part of the
traditional balancing of the governmental interest and the right
to free expression provide the appropriate test for regulations
that restrict free speech. The court of appeals failed to apply
these doctrines in Carew-Reid v. Metropolitan Transportation
Authority. 86 The decision thus creates a misleading precedent 187
and provides governmental bodies with support in their efforts
to apply the most convenient, even if obstructive, means of se-
curing their interests.
David H~bert
185. 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989).
186. 903 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1990).
187. Acorn v. St. Louis County, No. 89-3811 (8th Cir. April 8, 1991).
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